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ABSTRACT 
 
This study examines whether stocks deleted from the CAC 40 Parisian blue-chip index 
between 1993 and 2009 outperformed stocks added to the index. Two approaches are 
followed to answer this question. First, two portfolios are formed, one consisting of all 
stocks added to the index and one consisting of all stock deleted from the index between 
1993 and 2009. The substituted stocks are added to their respective portfolios 10 days 
after the announcement is made. Daily returns and daily adjusted returns are calculated. 
The results show that the deleted stock portfolio outperformed both the added stock 
portfolio and the market by 0.013% and 0.012% respectively per day. Risk adjusted 
performance ratios indicate that the higher return is not merely a compensation for higher 
risk. Nevertheless, it appears that the results cannot be generalised perhaps due to too 
small a sample. The second approach looks at the added and deleted stocks' average 
performance at different intervals after announcement of their addition to or removal 
from the CAC 40 is made. The results indicate that deleted stocks outperformed added 
stocks over the first five years after substitution. Deleted stocks showed an average 
increase in value of 4.1% compared to an average loss of 2.69% for added stocks one 
year after replacement was announced. After five years, deleted stocks' value increased 
on average by 53.5% while added stocks increased on average by 35.9%. Theoretically, 
the well researched phenomenon of regression towards the mean in stock prices as well 
as biased index rules may explain these results. 
 
______________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Regression towards the mean, Index Rebalancing, Investment Strategy, 
Contrarian Strategy, Winner Loser Effect 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This study examines whether stocks deleted from the CAC 40 Parisian blue-chip index 
between 1993 and 2009 outperformed stocks added to the index. 
 
A stock index provides investors with a snapshot of the evolution of the values which 
constitute it. These constitutive elements can for instance be companies listed on the 
same exchange (Topix in Japan), on the same continent (MSCI North America), which 
belong to the same industry (MSCI Europe Energy) or which have similar market 
capitalizations (Russel 2000). It is a widely held assumption among practitioners that 
stock indexes are neutral investment decisions and give for instance a representation of a 
country’s listed companies or in short of “the market”. Thus, stock indexes are used as 
benchmarks to measure the performance of actively managed portfolios whose goal is 
usually to beat their index and, by doing so, justifies the fees associated with holding 
them.  
 
Stock indexes are also at the centre of the thriving development of “passive investing” 
through such instruments as index funds and more recently ETFs. According to the 
national association of U.S. investment companies, the net assets invested in index funds 
increased 21 folds since 1993 to reach USD 604 billion in the US only at the end of 2008. 
The Economist (2011) also reports "exchange traded funds had almost $1.5 trillion of 
assets under management which correspond to an average annual growth rate of 34% 
over 10 years". There are two main reasons for their rapid development. On the one hand, 
fees charged to investors are lower than for actively managed funds. On the other hand, 
research has found that active funds do not outperform passive funds once the fees are 
accounted for. For instance, Carhart (1997) reports that nearly 1,500 U.S. mutual funds 
underperformed their benchmark every other year between 1962 and 1992. Moreover, 
funds that beat their index in the past tend not to beat it again in the future. (cf. Grinblatt 
and Titman 1989, Kazemi, Schneeweis & Pancholi 2003). 
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There are different categories of stock indexes. One way to differentiate between them is 
to look at whether their composition is inclusive or exclusive. Indeed a stock index is not 
a static benchmark; it requires periodical rebalancing in order to keep in line with its 
objective. Companies are added to or deleted from inclusive indexes according to a set of 
quantitative and measurable rules (USA’s 3,000 largest listed companies by market 
capitalisation for the Russel 3000 for instance). In this case, the addition or deletion of a 
company is neither left to the discretion of a committee nor does it directly depend on its 
relative over or underperformance. As such, inclusive indexes seem to be better 
candidates for neutral investment decisions. However, the world's most renowned and 
benchmarked stock indexes tend to be exclusive which means that their composition is 
decided by a steering committee responsible for the periodical review and selection of 
their constitutive elements. 
 
The French CAC 40 on which this thesis is based is an exclusive index. It tracks a sample 
of 40 blue-chip companies thought to be representative of the Parisian equity market and 
selected among the one hundred largest market capitalisation and most traded stocks 
listed on Euronext Paris. The index’s composition is reviewed by the "Conseil 
Scientifique" every quarter, though changes do not necessarily take place. Besides 
quantitative data such as market capitalisation and liquidity, the quality of representing 
the Parisian equity market is left to the discretion of the steering committee. The DJIA, 
S&P 500, FTSE 100, Nikkei 225, Dax 30 are other famous examples of exclusive 
indexes. 
 
Stock indexes are officially tied to very strict and objective rules as to why a stock should 
be added to or deleted from the index. These rules are in theory independent of stocks’ 
performances. However, Ranaldo and Häberle (2008: 55) have found that “any passive 
investment tracking these indexes turns into an active strategy characterised by market 
timing and state dependent performance and that market indexes imply forms of active 
investment management in disguise”. Given the critical and growing impact of stock 
index performances on investors’ wealth, I find it important to understand how stocks 
perform after they are added to or deleted from an exclusive index. However, and quite 
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surprisingly in my opinion, almost all of the research looking into the impact of index 
rebalancing focuses on short term stock prices and volatility in the aftermath of the 
substitution announcement and almost never on the long term behaviour of the replaced 
stocks. 
 
The results of this thesis are important because it is aiming at filling several gaps. They 
will further knowledge in a topic that has been left rather undocumented until now, they 
will help investors anticipate how stocks are likely to perform after they are added or 
deleted from an exclusive index thus perhaps creating a new contrarian investment 
strategy, they will help stock indexers be aware of potential selection bias in their index 
rules, and finally it is to my knowledge the first study of its kind to focus on a European 
index. 
 
 
1.1. Research problem and hypotheses 
 
Problem statement: 
 
Do stocks added to the CAC 40 stock index outperform those they replace? 
 
Hypotheses: 
 
The first and most prominent hypothesis of this study is that there exists a phenomenon 
of regression to the mean in equity markets. Balvers, Wu and Gilliland (2000: 745) define 
mean reversion as “a tendency of asset prices to return to a trend path”. The authors 
found strong evidence of mean reversion in the MSCI index which includes 18 countries 
with mature financial markets. Mean reversion suggests that firms that have been 
performing exceptionally well in the recent past are bound to lower performance in the 
future because they are likely to have been performing above their long term trend and 
capabilities. The reverse is also true for companies that have been performing poorly. 
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H1: There exists a phenomenon of regression to the mean in the stock market. 
 
Ranaldo and Häberle (2007) studied the constitution and rebalancing rules of several of 
the world's most commonly benchmarked active stock indexes. Their work showed how 
false an assumption it would be to consider a form of passive investment investments 
strategies replicating the performance of such indexes. Ranaldo and Häberle (2007: 55) 
concluded “the constitution and maintenance rules of exclusive indexes correspond to a 
set of active trading and investment rules similar to momentum strategies”. 
 
H2: Active stock index rules lead to the addition of the recent past’s best performing 
and the deletion of the recent past’s worst performing stocks to the index. 
 
The founding and still central paper of investors’ psychology were published in the early 
1970s. Kahneman and Tversky (1974) posited that regression to the mean is often 
misunderstood, insufficiently appreciated or ignored even when bound to happen. The 
two psychologists designed experiments which attempted to measure how rational 
individuals are in assessing the likelihood of certain events. The results showed that 
“people fail to "regress" or move to predicting the mean even when the input data is 
stated to be highly unreliable”. (Kahneman and Tversky 1973: 237.) What is more, the 
fact of ascribing cause to for instance increasing stock prices where none exist because 
the natural regression towards the mean is ignored is in the words of Milton Friedman 
(1992: 2131) “the most common fallacy in the statistical analysis of economic data”. 
 
H3: Steering committees in charge of index composition largely ignore the tendency 
of stock prices to regress to their long term trend. 
 
By extrapolating from these three hypotheses, I am able to formulate a fourth which will 
be the one tested in this thesis. Stocks deleted from an index may have been performing 
below their long term ability while stocks added to an index may have been performing 
above that ability for some time. As they regress to their long term ability however, 
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deleted stocks may outperform added stocks. This tendency may largely be ignored by 
steering committees either due to the regression fallacy or due to index rules enabling this 
pattern. 
 
H4: On the long run, stocks removed from the CAC 40 index may outperform the 
stocks replacing them as their performance regress to their long term trend. 
 
The two following hypotheses are not central to my thesis but enable me to adjust the 
methodology for some known market phenomena which may have an impact on the 
findings. I believe that this will improve the robustness of the results as well as better fit 
the logic behind my research question. 
 
Initiated by two studies by Shleifer (1986) and Harris and Gruel (1986), the periods 
surrounding an individual stock’s addition or deletion from an index have been since then 
thoroughly documented in the literature. Numerous studies of different indexes across the 
world have led to a widely accepted conclusion about a symmetric price effect with 
addition to an index leading to a price increase and deletion from an index leading to a 
price decrease as passive mutual funds managers readjust their holdings to match their 
target index and speculators try to anticipate and take advantage of stock replacements. 
The studies have found that abnormal returns and volume activity occur around the day 
of the announcement. The debate is about whether this price pressure is permanent as 
supported by Denis, McConnell, Ovtchinnikov and Yu (2003) or only temporary as 
supported by Shankar and Miller (2006). With regards to the CAC 40 index, Vespro 
(2006) finds evidence supporting the price pressure hypothesis over the time period 1997 
– 2001. In other words there seems to be only a temporary rise in the stock price and 
trading volume of the added security and a temporary fall in the stock price and trading 
volume of the deleted security. 
 
H5: Temporary abnormal market activities occur around the addition or deletion of a 
stock from the CAC 40 index. 
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Substantial evidence collected from various markets across the world has shown that 
initial public offerings (IPOs) traditionally exhibit three patterns: under pricing, "hot 
issue" markets (periods of high average initial returns and rising volume) and poor long 
term performance. The latter is the pattern of interest for this study. In France, Leleux 
(1993) investigated the performance of IPOs in the 48 months following their 
introduction on the Paris Secondary Market (now CAC mid 100); a Mid-cap index. He 
found that “an equal-amount investment in all IPO shares at the beginning of the first 
complete month of secondary trade would have earned investors an abnormal - 11.2 % 
rate of return over three years”. (Leleux 1993:106.) 
 
H6: IPO stocks underperform the market in the long-run and drag down the 
performance of the Addition portfolio. 
 
 
1.2. Review of earlier literature 
 
The pioneering studies of Shleifer (1986) and Harris and Gruel (1986) initiated an 
extensive literature on the effects of index rebalancing. The days and weeks surrounding 
an individual stock’s addition or deletion from an index have been since then thoroughly 
documented in the literature. The same conclusions have been drawn in most cases about 
the events occurring in the aftermath of the announcement and led to a widely accepted 
consensus about a symmetric price effect, addition incurs price increase and deletion 
incurs price decrease. There is, however, still a debate as to whether this price pressure is 
permanent or only temporary. 
 
Harris and Gurel (1986) report a significant price increase of 3% after a stock is added to 
the S&P 500. However, they also find that the price increase is nearly fully reverted two 
weeks after the addition. Other studies did not focus on a large-cap index and still found 
similar results. Shankar and Miller (2006) find that firms added to the S&P small cap 
index experience a price increase at announcement which is fully reverted 60 days after 
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inclusion. These results support the temporary price pressure hypothesis which states that 
long-run demand curves are perfectly elastic but can be temporarily shifted. Indeed, index 
fund managers must buy stocks added to an index and sell stocks removed from it. With 
such large institutions all making the same move at the same time, abnormal price 
pressures must occur. 
 
On the contrary, Shleifer (1986) find that the price increase experienced by a stock is still 
persistent at least 20 days after its inclusion in the S&P 500. More recently, Lynch and 
Mendenhall (1997) provide new evidence on stock price effects associated with changes 
in the S&P 500 index. For the additions, the authors find a significant positive cumulative 
abnormal return from the day after the announcement until the day before the effective 
change; while prices only partly revert on and after the effective date of the inclusion. 
The reverse holds true for deletions as well. A persisting effect on prices even after the 
announcement date is consistent with the hypothesis of downward sloping demand curves 
(also known as imperfect substitute hypothesis). Denis et al. (2003) also report a 
permanent price increase after a stock is added to the S&P 500 index. But unlike previous 
research, they do not consider a stock addition to an index to be an information-free 
event. Indeed, they document that newly included companies experience significant 
increases in earnings per share forecasts and realized earnings. These two elements in 
turn explain why newly added stocks experience a permanent price increase. 
 
Finally, Chen, Noronha and Singal (2006) reported that firms added to the S&P 500 
experience a permanent price increase whereas firms deleted from the index suffer only a 
temporary price decline. Investor’s awareness is proposed as an explanation for the 
asymmetric price response as investors become more aware of a stock added to the index 
but do not become less aware of a stock deleted from the index. 
 
Even though most attention has been given to US stock indexes, a few studies have used 
stock indexes elsewhere as benchmarks. Vespro (2006) uses three European indexes in 
her studies; London’s FTSE 100 and Paris’ CAC 40 and SBF 120 indexes. Her results 
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support the temporary price pressure hypothesis underlining the fact that once the index 
fund’s adjustment process ends, prices regress to their pre-announcement levels. 
 
The short-term effects of index rebalancing on individual stocks have been fairly well 
documented. In contrast, only little attention has been given to the effects of stock 
replacements on the overall index’s long-term performance. Arora, Carp and Smith 
(2006) showed that a portfolio consisting of all stocks removed from the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average since 1929 outperformed a portfolio consisting of all added stocks. 
They explain this result by the market’s insufficient consideration of the mean reversion 
phenomenon. Looking at a similar issue but from a slightly different angle, Siegel and 
Schwartz (2006) found that the companies chosen for the original S&P 500 in 1957 have 
yielded higher returns at a lower risk than the continually updated index. In a recent 
paper, Cai and Houge (2008) showed that a buy-and-hold portfolio strategy would have 
significantly outperformed the rebalanced Russel 2000 small-cap from 1974 to 2004 
index by 2.22 % a year and by 17.29 % over five years. The results outlined the index 
additions’ poor long-term returns relative to that of the index deletions.  
 
Interestingly, the results are consistent with studies assessing the efficacy of contrarian 
strategies such as the winner-loser effect based on stock’s recent performance (in lieu of 
addition to or deletion from an index). Balvers et al. (2000) demonstrate that holding the 
worst performing stocks of the past three years and short selling the best performing 
stocks of the past three years outperforms other investment strategies such as buy-and-
hold. Richard (1995, 1997), Narasimhan and Titman (1993) and De Bondt and Thaler 
(1985) had applied similar strategies and found similar results. Most recently, Rinne and 
Vähämaa (2011) found this strategy to yield superior results in Europe as well. 
 
 
1.3. Structure of the study 
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This thesis consists of 5 chapters. Chapter two provides the theoretical background for 
this study. It describes at length the phenomenon of regression towards the mean, the 
different theories that support it and the effects of its working on exclusive stock indexes. 
Chapter three presents the data used for the purpose of this study and the methodology 
followed to answer the research problem. Chapter four presents and analyzes the results. 
Finally chapter five presents the conclusions of this thesis and suggests some avenues for 
further related research.  
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2. THE PHENOMENON OF REGRESSION TOWARDS THE MEAN 
 
 
Although regression towards the mean is a rather straightforward concept and is reckoned 
with in social and medical sciences, its existence and origin in stock markets remains 
unclear and debated. 
 
 
2.1. General description of the statistical phenomenon 
 
The phenomenon of regression towards the mean was discovered and first described by 
Sir Francis Galton in 1869 when he stated that descendants of the most illustrious 
statesmen, musicians, scientists, painters and other outstanding people tend to be less 
talented than their eminent ancestors. Though his work approached regression towards 
the mean, he was unable to formally theorize it until 1889 when he studied a measurable 
quality; height. Galton examined the heights of fathers and sons and discovered that the 
sons of exceptionally tall fathers tend to be shorter than their fathers whereas sons of 
exceptionally short fathers tend to be taller. Galton (1889: 95) concluded “however 
paradoxical it may appear at first sight, it is theoretically a necessary fact, and one that 
is clearly confirmed by observation, that the Stature of the adult offspring must on the 
whole, be more mediocre than the stature of their Parents, that is to say, more near to the 
mean or mid of the general population”. Thus, the concept of regression towards the 
mean expresses the fact that if a variable is extreme on its first measurement, it will tend 
to be closer to the average on a second measurement. 
 
Assuming variables x and y have standard deviations  x and    and correlation 
coefficient r comprised between -1 and 1 (i.e. are not perfectly correlated); the definition 
of regression towards the mean in mathematical terms can be expressed as follows: 
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Thus a change of one standard deviation in x is associated with a change of r standard 
deviations in y. For a given value of x, the predicted value of y is always fewer standard 
deviations from its mean than is x from its mean. The data point exhibits regression 
towards the mean unless x and y are perfectly correlated. Subsequent work showed that 
regression towards the mean is not restricted to simple linear regressions of data points, it 
also occurs in cases where random variables follow a normal distribution or in other 
words have an identical marginal distribution with a mean.  
 
A common and simple example is to consider a class of students taking a 100 question 
true / false test. If all the students reply randomly to the questions then each score would 
be a realization of one of a set of independent and equally distributed random variables 
with a mean of 50. This is expressed in Figure 1 in which the distribution represents test 
scores on a single subject with a true mean of 50. Due to chance some students will score 
well above 50 while due to bad luck some others will score well below 50. In real life, 
students’ scores at true / false tests is often a combination of skills and luck. The best 
performers will be those who have combined skills and were not especially unlucky and 
those who were unskilled but were especially lucky whereas the worst performers will be 
those who have combined lack of skills and were not especially lucky and those who 
were skilled but were especially unlucky. After the first test, if a group comprising the 
best performers and a group comprising the worst performers are formed and students are 
asked to take a second true / false test, the best performers are likely to achieve a lower 
score while the worst performers are likely to achieve a higher score. The reason being 
that those who were especially lucky at the first test are unlikely to repeat their luck while 
those who were especially unlucky at the first test are more likely to be luckier. The 
aggregated effect is scores regressing to the mean. 
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Figure 1. Graphical example of true mean, variation and regression to the mean using a 
normal distribution. 
 
To summarize, observed scores fluctuate around a “true score” attributable to skills to 
which is added or subtracted a temporary mean reverting “error score” which can be 
attributed to the luck or bad luck component. Kaplan and Saccuzzo (2008) express it as 
follows: 
 
             
 
Where X is the observed score, T is the true score and ɛ is the identically distributed error 
term. The different values of ɛ are uncorrelated.  
 
Evidence of regression towards the mean has been documented in numerous fields with 
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important ramifications. In baseball, Schall and Smith (2000) found that batting averages 
and earned run averages regress towards the mean and therefore predictions can be 
improved substantially by shrinking performances towards the mean. Perhaps more 
importantly, in medical studies the practical problem caused by regression to the mean is 
to distinguish real change from expected natural variation. For instance, when 
considering a subject’s increased cholesterol level, physicians have to wonder whether it 
was not unusually low when measured the first time and is now not simply regressing to 
its “true score”. In social sciences and in drug testing, the understanding of regression to 
the mean has led to the introduction of control groups to separate the effect of treatments 
from the statistical effect of regression towards the mean (cf. Barneu, Van der Pols and 
Dobson, 2004: 218). For instance, patients with extremely high blood pressure may be 
treated to bring their values closer to healthier levels. If they are measured again, 
physicians will observe that the mean of the extreme group is now closer to the mean of 
the whole population. Without control group however, this should not be interpreted as 
showing the positive effect of the treatment since even if subjects were not treated the 
mean blood pressure would have gone down owing to the effects of regression towards 
the mean. 
 
There is also evidence of regression towards the mean in finance. Regression towards the 
mean implies for instance that companies exhibiting exceptionally low profitability 
(relative to their “true score” or true ability) for some time are bound to experiencing 
higher profitability in the future whereas companies exhibiting exceptionally high 
profitability (relative to their “true score” or true ability) for some time are bound to 
experiencing lower profitability in the future. Fama and French (2000: 161) investigated 
this issue and found “strong evidence that profitability (measured as the ratio of year t 
earnings before interest to total book assets, Yt/At) is mean reverting”. In the same vein, 
regression towards the mean would imply that, as for baseball players, the best prediction 
of a firm’s earning is the mean earning prediction. Keil, Smith and Smith (2004: 943) say: 
“persuasive evidence is found that relative earnings forecasts are systematically 
too extreme – too optimistic for companies predicted to do well and too pessimistic 
for those predicted to do poorly. The accuracy of these forecasts can be improved 
consistently and substantially by shrinking them towards the mean”.  
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Dorsey-Palmateera and Smith (2007) found similar results with predicting the level of T-
bills, T-bonds and corporate bonds. 
 
 
2.2. Regression towards the mean in stock markets 
 
Researchers also looked for evidence of regression towards the mean in stock markets. 
Despite numerous papers investigating the issue, it is still very much open to debate. For 
every paper supporting the view that stock prices or stock markets are mean reverting, 
there is another paper contradicting the results or casting doubt on the models used. The 
theoretical framework of regression towards the mean in stock prices implies that, in the 
same manner as for test scores, stock prices are the sum of a permanent component 
influenced by fundamental factors (the “true score”) which follows a random walk and a 
temporary mean reverting component. The reason for researchers’ interest in findings 
evidence of a mean reverting component in stock prices stems from the fact that it would 
imply some degree of predictability over long horizons. Several strategies have been used 
to demonstrate the mean reverting character of stock prices.  
 
2.2.1. Evidence of mean reversion in stock prices 
 
In an efficient market, stock prices are supposed to rise at a constant rate and past returns 
should give no indication whatsoever about future returns. In other words, in a regression 
of stock returns on a constant term and past returns, the constant term should be positive 
but the slope coefficient on past returns should be zero. To the contrary, if returns are 
mean reverting, the slope should be negative as periods of abnormally high returns are 
followed by periods of abnormally low returns. Figure 2 shows the behavior of stock 
prices in an efficient market and how it differs from the behavior of stock prices in an 
inefficient market. 
21 
  
 
 
Figure 2. Stock prices in an inefficient market. (Source: Engel and Morris 1991) 
 
In the example above taken from Engel and Morris (1991:25), a company’s stock price 
jumps as it announces higher dividends will be paid out. Because the return over the first 
period is 30% instead of 10%, feedback traders buy the stock thus pushing the price 
above its fundamental value (represented by the dashed line). Value traders will then 
begin selling the overvalued stock putting downward pressure on its price and causing the 
return to fall over the next few periods. Feedback traders are also likely to begin selling 
the stock following periods of low returns adding downward pressure on the stock price 
as in a self fulfilling prophecy. Eventually the price returns to its fundamental value after 
a period of abnormally high returns followed by a period of abnormally low returns. 
 
Early tests of market efficiency focused on daily and monthly returns and found the slope 
to be very close to zero. Researchers therefore concluded that markets were efficient. In 
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retrospect however, the results are not surprising as regression towards the mean is 
thought to take place over long horizons. Fama and French (1988) are among the first to 
run regression tests over several decades to find out if returns become negatively 
correlated as the holding period increases. They took on to examining monthly returns for 
holding periods of between one and five years for all stocks listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange over the period 1926 – 1985 expecting to find significant negative 
autocorrelations for longer holding periods thereby showing that stock prices are at least 
partly predictable. In accordance with the efficient market theory and with previous work, 
holding periods of less than a year do not exhibit mean reversion. Autocorrelations 
become negative after two years and reach a low for holding periods of three to five 
years. The authors found that an astonishing 35% of stock returns are predictable. 
Beyond five years, the autocorrelations become positive again implying that the random 
walk component of the price eventually takes over the variation of returns. The authors 
also found mean reversion to be stronger for smaller firms. Finally, it seems that most of 
the predictability is due to the earlier data. Fama and French (1988: 266) conclude:  
“stationary price components may be less important after 1940, or perhaps prices 
no longer have such temporary components. Resolution of this issue will require 
more powerful statistical techniques”. 
 
2.2.2. Evidence of mean reversion in volatility 
 
In both efficient and inefficient markets, stock prices are volatile because they react to 
new information. In the long run, volatility is the same whether prices are mean reverting 
or not. However, in inefficient markets, short term volatility is higher than in efficient 
markets because investors react irrationally to new information. Poterba and Summers 
(1988) demonstrate that if stock prices indeed followed a random walk, the variance of 
stock returns should be proportional to the return horizon and short term volatility should 
not be any higher than long term volatility. In other words, if markets were efficient, the 
variance of n-year returns (rn) should equal n times the variance of annual returns (r1). 
To the contrary, if returns are mean reverting, the ratio should fall below zero. 
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(3)    Variance (rn) = n x Variance (r1) 
 
Or 
 
(4)    Variance (rn) / (k x Variance (r1)) = 1 
 
Figure 3 gives an example taken from Engel and Morris (1991:27). In an efficient market, 
if a stock’s price can either rise 20% or fall 10% a year (represented by the solid lines), 
then for a two-year investment, the best possible return is 40% and the worst a negative 
20%, leading to a volatility of 60%. If prices are mean reverting however, because they 
deviate from their fundamental value in the short term but not in the long term they might 
for instance rise by 30% or fall 20% (represented by the dashed lines) the first year 
(volatility is 50%) before returning to its fundamental value. In this case, the volatility 
over the second year would have to be much lower than over the first year. 
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Figure 3. Investment risk in an inefficient market. (Source: Engel and Morris 1991) 
 
To investigate mean reversion in stock prices by looking at returns volatility, Poterba and 
Summers (1988) looked at the variability of monthly returns on the New York Stock 
Exchange between 1926 and 1985 as well as in several markets outside the US over 
increasing holding periods. The aggregated results show that for holding periods of 
between two and eight years, return variance increases less than proportionally with time 
implying that the temporary mean reverting component accounts for a part of the 
variance in returns. However, the robustness of the findings is weak and the authors 
conclude “although individual data sets do not consistently permit rejections of the 
random-walk hypothesis at high significance levels, the various data sets together 
strengthen the case against its validity”. (Poterba and Summers 1988: 59.) 
 
2.2.3. Evidence of mean reversion in multivariate time series 
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The evidence to support regression towards the mean being somewhat weak when 
looking only at returns and volatility, researchers started to use multivariate time series 
analysis to identify permanent and temporary components in stock prices. For instance, 
Cochrane (1994) examines annual changes in stock prices together with annual changes 
in dividends between 1927 and 1988 while Lee (1995) looks at stock price-dividend 
spreads and real stock prices over the 1926 – 1991 period. Both studies report a sizeable 
mean reverting component in stock prices. The international evidence supports the case 
for the existence of a mean reverting component in stock prices. Gallagher (1999) 
identifies the temporary and permanent components of real stock prices analyzing real 
stock returns and inflation. Using quarterly data for 16 countries between 1957 and 1995, 
the author finds the temporary mean reverting component to explain between 7 and 64% 
of the variation in real stock returns depending on the country. The majority of these 
studies have examined the dividend-price ratio as a forecasting factor of stock returns. A 
few have also considered aggregate business or macroeconomics factors. Gallagher and 
Taylor (2002) estimate the mean reverting component of US stock prices using inflation, 
interest rates, output, the wage rate and consumption between 1949 and 1997. The 
authors found that monthly US real stock prices reveal a mean reverting component 
accounting for 42% of the stock price variation. 
 
2.2.4. Evidence of mean reversion in stock indexes 
 
As shown earlier, regression towards the mean takes place at both individual and group 
level in social and medical sciences. In the same manner, given that evidence of 
regression towards the mean is found in stock prices it is likely to be found in stock 
market indexes as well. However, few studies have looked for evidence of regression 
towards the mean at an aggregated level. Of them was conducted by Balvers et al. (2000: 
745) who define mean reversion as “a tendency of asset prices to return to a trend path”. 
The authors compared annual returns on 18 stock indexes of countries with mature 
financial markets between 1969 and 1996 with returns on a reference index; the Morgan 
Stanley Capital International (MSCI) world index which includes, among others, the 18 
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countries under investigation. The results support the assumption that stock indexes are 
mean reverting relative to a reference index. The authors found the phenomenon to have 
a half life span of between 3 and 3.5 years. 
 
2.2.5. Evidence against the existence of regression to the mean 
 
Despite the evidence mentioned above and although I assume in this thesis that stock 
prices are mean reverting (hypothesis 1), it is worth mentioning that the academic world 
has not yet come to an agreement. 
 
Common critics of papers claiming to have found evidence of regression towards the 
mean in stock markets include: 
 Most studies are based on small samples of non-overlapping time series. For 
instance in Fama and French (1988), there are only 12 independent observations 
of five-year returns (60 years divided by five). 
 Mean reversion disappears if pre-war data are not taken into account. This was 
already noticed by Fama and French (1988: 266). Kim and Nelson (1997) 
examined data from the NYSE between 1947 and 1995 and found little evidence 
of mean reversion. 
 The results are based on models which tend to amplify the degree of mean 
reversion in stock markets (cf. Daniel: 2001). Richardson (1993: 201) explains 
“the overall conclusion from this work is that long-horizon t-statistics tend to 
overstate the degree of mean reversion in the data”. 
 Perron and Vodounou (2004) and Clark and Coggin (2011) are just two recent 
examples of recent studies who assert that stock prices follow a random walk and 
have not found any significant mean reverting component. 
 
27 
  
The momentum effect has been widely documented in the financial literature. It 
expresses the fact that shares that have performed well in the recent past continue to do so 
for some time which, at first sight, seems contradicting the existence of regression 
towards the mean. Narasimhan and Titman (1993) found that holding for 6 months a 
portfolio consisting of stocks that have performed well over the past 6 months 
outperforms a portfolio consisting of stocks that have performed poorly over the past 6 
months by about 1% per month. A long term international study was recently undertaken 
by Dimson, Marsh and Staunton (2008). Using data on the UK's 100 largest stocks 
between 1900 and 2007, the authors found that buying the 20 best performers and 
shorting the worst performers over the past 12 months and then rebalancing the portfolio 
every month produced an annual excess return of 10.3%. Using shorter time-series data 
from 2001 to 2007, they found similar results in 16 other markets with winners 
outperforming losers by 4% a year in the US, 21% in France and an astonishing 39% in 
Germany.  
 
However, momentum in stock prices does not contradict the existence of mean 
regression. In fact, it seems to constitute the first leg of the phenomenon. Papers reviewed 
as part of this thesis find evidence of momentum in stock prices over short to medium 
periods of time (1 to 6 months) while mean regression is found to take place over long 
periods of time (2 to 5 years). 
 
 
2.3. Regression towards the mean in stock markets and market efficiency 
 
Proponents of the efficient market theory see in mean regression the workings of more 
sophisticated equilibrium models. To the contrary, opponents of the efficient market 
theory see in mean regression the sign of investors' irrationality which is incompatible 
with efficient markets. 
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The first theory is supported by Fama and French (1988) and Cecchetti, Lam and Mark 
(1990) among others. The researchers argue that mean reversion results from the 
workings of efficient markets and that some degree of predictability in stock returns does 
not rule out this fundamental theory. Their argument is that expected returns correspond 
to the discount rates that relate a current stock price to expected future dividends. In the 
“basic” definition of efficient markets, the expected real returns are assumed to be 
constant over time because real interest rates are assumed to be constant. However, 
assuming real interest rates vary in time and are mean reverting, returns should also vary 
in time and be mean reverting even in an efficient market. The authors describe several 
scenarios that could contribute to changes in real interest rates. For instance, if investors’ 
risk aversion and firms’ riskiness changed over time, interest rates and therefore expected 
returns would vary as well. Thus if interest rates are mean reverting, perhaps due to 
investors' smoothing their consumption or because rates fall during recessions and rise 
during booms, stock prices may appear mean reverting even if the market is efficient. In 
this case, the mean reverting component in stock prices would become indistinguishable 
from the temporary price components of an inefficient market. 
 
Again Engel and Morris (1991: 31) provide a good illustration. Suppose that interest rates 
fall at the end of period one due to a fall in riskless interest rate, in the riskiness of stocks 
or in investors' risk aversion. According to the theory of efficient markets, this causes the 
stock price to rise. At the same time, the lower interest rate implies that future prices will 
grow at a slower rate. As figure 4 shows, the stock price first jumps above the previous 
trend and then reverts towards the old trend as if the market was inefficient. 
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Figure 4. Effect of a change in interest rates on stock prices in an efficient market. 
(Source: Engel and Morris 1991) 
 
However, many question the paradigm that markets are efficient in the first place. 
Interestingly, Poterba and Summers (1988) tested by how much annual expected returns 
would need to vary in order to account for observed levels of mean reversion in their 
sample. They calculated that the annual standard deviation of expected returns would 
have to be between 4.4 and 15.8%. Given that rational investors put their money into 
stocks only if they expect a positive return, the standard deviation of required returns 
imply that expected returns have to frequently exceed 20% which they judge implausible. 
They conclude that "substantial variability in required returns is needed to explain mean 
reversion in prices" and attribute their results to the fact that markets are inefficient. 
(Poterba and Summers 1988: 59.) 
 
As shown by quantity of research done in the field of financial psychology, investors 
often do not act nor react rationally (cf. De Bondt and Thaler: 1985, Kahneman and 
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Riepe: 1998, Odean: 1999, Shiller: 2000). Engels and Morris (1991: 21) ask "what 
information could have possibly caused the profitability of the companies in the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average to fall 23 percent on October 19, 1987?" The fact that markets 
may not be efficient is the basis of the second theory. 
 
The theory states that, although they ultimately reflect fundamental values, irrational 
investors cause stock prices to substantially diverge from them in the short to medium 
term, hence mean reversion. The basic mechanism works as follows. If noise traders are 
optimistic about a stock, a sector or an asset class in general, its price will rise above 
fundamental value. If noise traders' fad does not revert and prices keep rising, other types 
of investors such as "feedback traders", "trend chasers" and "chartists" will buy the asset 
pushing its price even higher. In addition, as discussed by Schleifer and Vishny (1997), 
real life arbitragers concerned by the returns they are able to offer their customers for 
commercial reasons may not arbitrage the anomaly away as the financial theory suggests 
but to the contrary amplify it by jumping on the bandwagon. The combined effects of 
their actions is that, in the absence of traditional arbitrageurs to mitigate excesses, market 
prices may diverge substantially from fundamental prices for long periods of time (cf. De 
Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann: 1990). Shiller (2000: 56) calls this mechanism 
"naturally occurring Ponzi schemes" because it feeds on the perception of prior success. 
 
The trend starts to change due to the mean reverting nature of the market. Indeed, in such 
a market, investors develop expectations about the speed of the reversion. When an 
investor observes a positive change in a stock’s return, his reaction will be different 
whether he expects the reversion to be close or distant in time. If he expects a quick 
reversion, the investor will sell the stock to realize the gain. On the other hand, if he 
expects the reversion to take place in a more distant future, he will hold onto the stock 
and perhaps increase its holding. The market trend changes when investors realize they 
misapprehended the speed of the mean regression. At this point, the most risk adverse 
investors who expect mean reversion to be close will sell first, followed by more risk 
prone investors as they realize the trend is changing. This is when the above mentioned 
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"feedback traders", "trend chasers" and "chartists" begin selling poorly performing 
stocks, thus amplifying the effects. Hillebrand (2003) describes how this mechanism 
might be responsible for stock-market crashes; in particular the October 1987 crack. 
 
 
2.4. Index rules and regression towards the mean 
 
The paper by Arora et al. (2008) is the backbone of this thesis. In their paper, the 
researchers show that stocks added to the Dow Jones Industrial Index underperform 
stocks deleted from the index. The authors theorise that financial markets exhibit mean 
regression, and therefore that companies exhibiting exceptionally low returns relative to 
their true ability for some time are bound to experiencing higher returns in the future 
whereas companies exhibiting exceptionally high returns relative to their true ability for 
some time are bound to experiencing lower returns in the future. Citing Kahneman and 
Tversky (1974), they posit that regression to the mean is "often misunderstood or 
insufficiently appreciated”. (Arora et al. 2008: 65.) Their logic implies that stock 
indexers are therefore bound to add companies that have performed above their ability to 
the index and delete companies that have performed below their ability from the index. 
Hence, they expect that deleted stocks will outperform added stocks as they regress to 
their true ability (Arora et al. 2008). However, in my opinion, their reasoning relies on an 
important underlying assumption which they fail to clearly mention or demonstrate. 
Indeed, they assume that steering committees in charge of stock indexes tend to drop 
poorly performing companies and add fast growing ones unconsciously. If this were not 
the case, the authors' conclusion about mean regression being the reason why stocks 
added to a blue chip index underperform stocks deleted from the same index would not 
hold. 
 
The literature looking into exclusive stock indexes' rules and their influence on 
composition and performance is very sparse. In fact, there is to my knowledge only one 
paper which (indirectly) attended to look into what kind of stocks tend to be added to or 
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deleted from exclusive stock indexes. Ranaldo and Häberle’s (2008) conclusions 
demonstrate that exclusive indexes' constitution and maintenance rules imply some active 
trading strategies based on stocks’ past returns in many ways similar to momentum 
investment strategies. Their findings in effect contradict the assertion that stock index 
rebalancing is independent from stocks’ past performances and, more importantly for my 
thesis, support the assumption that stock indexers tend to add “rising stars” to their index 
and drop “fallen angels”. The first part of their paper compares the risk-adjusted 
performance of exclusive indexes with the performance of inclusive indexes. The authors 
find that exclusive indexes outperform inclusive indexes in upward markets. For instance, 
between 1990 and 2004, the CAC 40 total return was 51% during bull periods compared 
to 47.8% for the inclusive SBF 250 (250 largest market capitalisations on the Parisian 
exchange). They also find the opposite to be true; exclusive indexes underperform 
inclusive indexes in downward markets. Over the same period, the CAC 40 total return 
was -63% compared to -54.7% for the SBF 250. Ranaldo and Häberle (2008) find that 
exclusive indexes have a higher market beta which in turn is due to the active rebalancing 
of the index constituents. The authors conclude “constitution and maintenance rules of 
exclusive indexes correspond to a set of active trading and investment rules similar to 
momentum strategies”. (Ranaldo and Häberle 2008: 55.) 
 
The lack of stability of stock indexes in risk exposure is confirmed by Amenc, Goltz and 
Le Sourd (2006). The researchers tested the stability of several indexes, among them the 
CAC 40, in terms of exposure to both investment styles and industry sectors and found 
that these vary drastically over time. Thus, stock indexes’ performance is in essence 
state-dependant and variable over time which is at odds with the idea of a passive 
investment strategy. 
 
The implications for my thesis of momentum in stock prices followed by regression 
towards their true ability in addition to the fact that index rules are biased towards adding 
stocks that have performed well in the recent past and deleting stocks that have 
performed poorly in the recent past, should lead to stocks added to an exclusive index 
underperforming those deleted.  
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
The approach I follow in order to answer the research question is two-fold and partly 
based on the paper by Arora et al. (2008). In a first stage, the authors, using a buy-and-
hold strategy, calculate the average daily returns for two portfolios; one composed of 
stocks added to and one composed of stocks deleted from the Dow Jones Industrial index. 
They, then, took on to test if the difference in returns was due to higher undertaken risk. 
In a second stage, the authors compare deleted and added stocks' average performance at 
regular intervals after substitution is announced. In addition to that, I feel that calculating 
abnormal returns (compared to the benchmark index) could add value to the results. 
Another difference is that I chose not to take account of the daily returns on the stocks 
being replaced for the following 10 trading days after the announcement is made. I aim to 
adjust for well known abnormal market activities surrounding stock replacements as 
passive mutual fund managers readjust their holdings and speculators try to anticipate and 
take advantage of it.  
 
 
3.1. Data 
 
This thesis is based on the CAC 40 index; the main benchmark for the Parisian bourse. It 
tracks a sample of 40 blue chip companies thought to be representative of the Parisian 
equity market and selected among the top 100 market capitalisation and most active 
stocks listed on Euronext Paris. This list is publicly available on Euronext’s website 
which is said to help investors anticipate the index's rebalancing. The index’s base value 
of 1,000 was set on 31 December 1987. Its all-time high at 6,922.33 points was reached 
at the peak of the dot-com bubble in September 2000. Since December 1
st
, 2003, the 
index's weighting system is based on free-float adjusted market capitalisation. The 
maximum weight of any particular stock in the index cannot exceed 15%. The CAC 40 is 
one of the main national stock indexes that merged in 2000 to form the pan-European 
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stock exchange group Euronext; the world’s fourth largest stock market by market value 
in 2009. The “Conseil Scientifique” is the index steering committee responsible for 
setting the rules and the periodical selection. The index’s composition is reviewed every 
quarter though changes do not occur each time. If changes are decided, there is a 
minimum of two weeks between the review meeting and the actual index rebalancing. 
Also changes are always announced after the stock market closes on the meeting day. 
Figure 5 below shows the number of annual clean changes in the CAC 40 index over the 
period 1993 – 2009. 
 
 
Figure 5. Number of annual changes in the CAC 40 index. 
 
Two portfolios are formed; one including all clean additions and the other including all 
clean deletions that occurred on the CAC 40 index between 1993 and 2009. In 
accordance with Arora et al. (2008: 66), I use only clean changes and therefore ignore 
those that were due to mergers, acquisitions, or name changes that did not involve the 
addition of one stock and deletion of another. In other words, only changes initiated and 
decided by the Steering committee and not forced upon it form one or the other portfolio. 
 
Between 1993 and 2009, there have been a total of 25 clean changes made on the CAC 
40 index. I could not find any historical price regarding “Chargeur”; a company that was 
deleted from the index in 1993 and split off three years later. The first addition to the 
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portfolios took place on November 4th, 1993 and terminal wealth is as of December 31
st
, 
2009. The study covers 4,095 trading days. 
 
The historical price database available on the NYSE Euronext website allows me to track 
daily returns on the Parisian stock index for companies that are still currently listed as 
well as the stock indexers’ rebalancing decisions back to August 2005. To collect 
historical daily returns on companies that are no longer listed and rebalancing decisions 
prior to August 2005, I have to use the online archives of one of the most authoritative 
French financial newspapers "Les Echos". 
 
Finally, the Euribor 3-Month is used to calculate the Sharpe and Treynor ratios and hence 
determine the portfolios risk-adjusted performance. The French Pibor-3 month is used for 
the period prior to the launch of the European interbank offer rate on December 28
th
 
1998. The data was provided by the University of Vaasa. 
 
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
3.2.1. Construction of the portfolios 
 
I endeavour to answer the research question using two different methodologies. In the 
first, the funds are invested equally in each of the stocks at the beginning of the study 
period and then after each index rebalancing. For instance (see appendix 1), one third of 
the funds are invested in each of the three replaced stock at the beginning of the study 
period (October 19
th
, 1993) followed by one sixth in each of the six stocks replaced after 
the second index rebalancing (January 11
th
, 1994), and so on.... The stocks are added to 
their respective portfolio ten trading days after the replacement was officially announced 
in order to adjust for known temporary abnormal market activities surrounding stock's 
replacements in the CAC 40 index and other indexes. I follow a buy-and-hold strategy 
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and keep the stocks in the portfolios until the end of the study period without short selling 
the added stocks. 
 
Addition and deletion timetable: 
 
       Typically 30 days 
      AD                                                     ED 
 
 
                            
               AD + 10 days 
 
        
      Expected post announcement shocks 
 
 
AD: Announcement date of the change (after stock market closes). 
ED: Date when the change takes place. 
AD + 10 days: Stocks are added to their respective portfolios 10 trading days after the 
announcement is made. 
 
In the second approach, I look at the average daily performance of all added and deleted 
stocks at regular intervals over a period of five trading years beginning ten trading days 
after the replacement was officially announced. The delay is to adjust for known 
temporary abnormal market activities surrounding stock's replacements in the CAC 40 
index. 
 
If a stock that had been previously deleted from the CAC 40 is once again included in it, 
it moves from the deletion portfolio to the addition portfolio. Following the same logic, if 
a stock that is in the addition portfolio is deleted from the CAC 40, it moves back from 
the addition portfolio to the deletion portfolio. In this particular case and although 
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evidence of pre announcement abnormal price and volume activities have been found in 
the days preceding a stock's addition to or deletion from an index, I decided not to 
exclude any daily return prior to the announcement date to ensure that investors are able 
to base their investment strategy on my findings. 
 
3.2.2. Portfolios performance 
 
3.2.2.1. Stock returns 
 
The fact that I need to aggregate individual stocks' daily return to calculate the portfolio's 
return makes the use of arithmetic returns more appropriate. 
 
The return on an individual stock is given by: 
 
             
    
      
    
 
With 
Pi;t = Price of stock i at time t 
Pi;t-1 = Price of stock i at time t-1 
 
3.2.2.2. Portfolio returns 
 
Since the portfolios are equally weighted, the return on day t is given by averaging the 
arithmetic returns of the stocks which constitute them and are given by: 
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With: 
I = Number of stocks in the portfolio 
ri,t = Return on stock i at time t 
 
The daily returns are then multiplied to calculate the cumulative returns and the final 
wealth: 
 
                  
 
   
    
 
With: 
rp,t = Return on the portfolio at time t 
 
3.2.2.3. Portfolio adjusted returns 
 
Another way of assessing the portfolios' performance is to calculate their return in excess 
of the market as a whole. The cumulative adjusted return strategy was not part of Arora et 
al.'s (2008) paper but I believe this adds interesting results and later studies could be 
based on adjusted returns instead of “normal” returns. 
 
The first step is to calculate the portfolios' daily benchmark-adjusted returns:  
 
                           
 
With:  
rp,t = Return on the portfolio at time t as calculated in formulas (1) and (2)  
rm,t = Return on the CAC 40 index 
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The daily adjusted returns are then multiplied to calculate the cumulative adjusted 
returns: 
 
                     
 
   
    
 
With: 
arp,t = Adjusted return on the portfolio at time t 
 
3.2.2.4. Statistical significance 
 
To assess the statistical difference in returns between the two portfolios, a matched-pair t-
test is performed using the daily difference between the returns on the Deletion portfolio 
and the Addition portfolio. The null hypothesis is that the expected value of the 
difference in each day's return should be zero. The t-statistic shows how much or how 
little the null hypothesis is supported by the data. It is calculated as follow: 
 
           
     
      
 
 
With: 
   = Mean of daily differences 
s = Standard deviation of the daily differences 
n = Number of daily differences 
 
3.2.3. Measure of risk 
 
Given that assets or portfolios with greater risks have higher expected returns, it is crucial 
to compare portfolios not only on their returns but also on the risk undertaken when 
investing in one of them. Researchers in the 1960’s have started to address this problem 
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and developed several measurement tools that look at both returns and risk to evaluate 
portfolios’ performances. They are called risk-adjustment performance metrics (RAPM) 
and are typically based on the central Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) developed by 
Treynor (1962), Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). The CAPM addresses the problem of 
adjusting returns given a portfolio's risk. The model states that the expected return of a 
security or a portfolio equals the rate of return on a risk-free security plus a risk premium. 
 
The Treynor ratio (also known as the Reward-to-Volatility-Ratio) was the first to provide 
investors with a composite measure of portfolio performance that also included risk. It 
was developed by J. L. Treynor in the early 60’s and measures the returns earned in 
excess of those that could have been earned on a riskless investment per unit of market 
risk. 
 
           
      
 
 
 
where rp is the return of the portfolio, rf is the risk free rate of interest (such as the Euribor 
3 Months) and β the volatility of the portfolio.  
 
The Sharpe ratio (or Reward-to-Variability Ratio) is almost identical to the Treynor ratio 
except that the risk measure is the standard deviation of the portfolio instead of 
considering the systematic risk, represented by beta: 
 
           
      
 
 
 
where rp is the return of the portfolio, rf is the risk free rate of interest (in this thesis the 
Euribor 3 Months) and σ is the standard deviation of the portfolio’s excess return. 
 
The greater a portfolio's Treynor or Sharpe ratio, the better its risk-adjusted performance 
has been. 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
 
4.1. Portfolios’ and index historical performance 
 
Figure 6 shows the cumulative returns on both the Deletion and Addition portfolios as 
well as on the CAC 40 index over the 16 years to 2009. The Deletion portfolio has the 
highest terminal value as of December 31
st
 2009 followed by the Parisian index and 
finally the Deletion portfolio. The cumulative returns of the Deletion portfolio 
(represented by the red line) remain at any point in time higher than the performance of 
both the index (represented by the blue line) and the Addition portfolio (represented by 
the green line). Without accounting for risk, the Addition portfolio clearly 
underperformed both the CAC 40 index and the Deletion portfolio. 
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Figure 6. Cumulative returns in percent on both portfolios and the CAC 40 index 
between 1993 and 2009. 
 
Figure 7 shows the difference in cumulative returns between the Deletion and the 
Addition portfolios over the period 1993 – 2009. The trend is clearly positive and steadily 
increasing which indicates that the Deletion portfolio outperforms the Addition portfolio 
for most of the period considered. The financial crises of the early 2000s and of 2007 
show to be the exceptions with the difference in returns between the two portfolios being 
more volatile. 
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Figure 7. Difference in portfolios’ cumulative returns (Deletion minus Addition) 
between 1993 and 2009. 
 
 
4.2. Comparison of the portfolios’ returns 
 
4.2.1. Portfolios’ arithmetic returns 
 
Table 1 summarises the daily returns for the Deletion and Addition portfolios over the 
period 1993 – 2009. The portfolio formed of stocks removed from the index had an 
average daily return of 0.038% compared to 0.025% for the Addition portfolio. Assuming 
250 trading days per year, this translates into an average annual return of 9.87% for the 
Deletion portfolio and 6.54% for the Addition portfolio. Consistent with my hypotheses 
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H1 to H4, stocks deleted from the CAC 40 index between 1993 and 2009 outperformed 
the stocks that replaced them by an average of 0.013% every day or 3.3% per year. 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of the Deletion and Addition portfolios’ daily returns over 
the period 1993 – 2009. 
 Deletion Portfolio Addition Portfolio 
Average daily return (%) 0.038 0.025 
Difference in mean (2-
tailed) 0.544 
Minimum (%) -8.99 -9.47 
Maximum (%) 10.58 12.72 
Std. Deviation 0.014 0.016 
Skewness 0.128 0.215 
Kurtosis 3.55 4.461 
Terminal wealth (for €1 
invested as of December 
31st, 2009) 
€3.10 €1.71 
Sharpe ratio 2.7 1.7 
Treynor ratio 0.06 0.03 
 
The kurtoses are 3.55 and 4.46 indicating distributions rather clustered in the centre 
around the mean while the tails are relatively flat. The positive skewness for both 
portfolios in turn indicates scores clustered to the left at the low values. The table also 
shows that €1 invested in the Deletion portfolio in 1993 would have been worth €3.10 on 
December 31st, 2009 whereas €1 invested in the Addition portfolio would have been 
worth only €1.71. Furthermore, the higher returns are not due to some sort of risk 
premium. Indeed, both the Sharpe and the Treynor ratios are higher for the Deletion 
portfolio than for the Addition portfolio which indicates that the risk adjusted 
performance of the former is higher than that of the latter. Nevertheless, the t-test score 
indicates that the results cannot be generalised. This might be due to the period covered 
in my thesis being too short. Indeed, the most directly comparable studies use much 
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longer time-series. Arora et al. (2008) study the Dow Jones Industrial Index since its 
launch in 1928, Siegel and Schwartz (2006) use the S&P 500 since 1957 and finally Cai 
and Houge (2008) look at the Russel 2000 since 1979. 
 
Table 2 shows that the portfolio formed of stocks deleted from the index had an average 
daily return of 0.038% compared to 0.019% for the Addition minus IPOs portfolio. 
Consistent with my hypotheses H1 to H4, stocks deleted from the CAC 40 index between 
1993 and 2009 outperformed the stocks that were added to the index by an average of 
0.019% every day. Furthermore, it seems that the higher returns are not due to some sort 
of risk premium since the risk adjusted performance as measured by the Sharpe and the 
Treynor ratios is higher for the Deletion portfolio than for the Addition minus IPOs 
portfolio. Nevertheless, the t-test score again indicates that the results cannot be 
generalised. 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of the Deletion and Addition minus IPOs portfolios’ daily 
returns over the period 1993 – 2009. 
 Deletion Portfolio Addition minus IPOs 
portfolio 
Average daily return (%) 0.038 0.019 
Difference in mean (2-
tailed) 0.38 
Minimum (%) -8.99 -10.37 
Maximum (%) 10.58 11.42 
Std. Deviation 0.014 0.016 
Skewness 0.128 0.135 
Kurtosis 3.55 4.329 
Terminal wealth (for €1 
invested as of December 
31st, 2009) 
€3.10 €1.31 
Sharpe ratio 2.7 1.2 
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Treynor ratio 0.06 0.02 
 
Substantial evidence collected from various markets across the world has shown that 
IPOs traditionally exhibit three patterns: under pricing, "hot issue" markets (periods of 
high average initial returns and rising volume) and poor long term performances. As a 
result, stocks added to the index following the first floatation of their shares may lower 
the performance of the Addition portfolio. However, in contradiction with the general 
consensus on IPOs' long term performance including French studies (cf. Leleux: 1993) 
and my hypothesis H6, I did not find that IPO companies underperform other additions to 
the CAC 40 index. In fact, not only did the Addition portfolio perform better with the 
IPO companies than without (0.025% Vs. 0.019% per day) but the IPO companies also 
outperformed the CAC 40 index (0.041% Vs. 0.026% per day). When looking at the 
Sharpe and Treynor ratios, IPO companies in fact improve the portfolio’s risk adjusted 
performance (1.7 Vs. 1.2 for the Sharpe and 0.03 Vs. 0.02 for the Treynor ratio). 
 
The explanation might lay in the nature of the five IPO companies that were added to the 
index between 1993 and 2009. IPO companies were in fact among the country's largest 
and most established companies before they were privatized by successive governments. 
A wave of privatization of large public companies started in 1993 with what is now one 
of Europe's largest bank, BNP Paribas. The privatization of car manufacturer Renault 
followed suit in 1995. The other three IPOs consist of utility companies who experienced 
a monopolistic position before their respective markets had to be open to competition in 
order to comply with EU regulations and their shares sold to the public. The three 
companies are France Telecom, Europe's third largest telecommunication company 
privatized in 1997, GDF and EDF which are respectively among the world's largest gas 
and electricity utility companies and were privatized in 2005. Telecoms and utilities are 
known by investors for having steady returns and low volatility which may explain why 
they did not underperform as IPO companies tend to. 
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Given that the Addition portfolio including the IPO companies exhibits a better 
performance than without the IPO companies, from here on I will only consider the 
Addition portfolio including the IPO companies. 
 
4.2.2. Portfolios’ market adjusted returns 
 
Figure 8 shows the cumulative market adjusted returns on both Deletion and Addition 
portfolios between 1993 and 2009. The Deletion portfolio (represented by the red line) 
has the highest terminal value as of December 31
st
 2009. However, this seems to come at 
the price of a much higher variability in returns. 
 
 
Figure 8. Cumulative adjusted returns in percent on both portfolios between 1993 and 
2009. 
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Table 3 summarises the daily returns for the Deletion and Addition portfolios over the 
period 1993 – 2009 adjusted for market returns. The portfolio formed of stocks removed 
from the index had an average adjusted daily return of 0.012% or 3.07% annually 
compared to an average adjusted daily loss of (0.0002)% or (0.06%) annually for the 
Addition portfolio. Furthermore, the Deletion portfolio yielded 21.5% abnormal return at 
the end of the 16 years of the study period whereas the Addition portfolio suffered a loss 
of 9.1%. It also shows that the Deletion portfolio not only outperformed the Addition 
portfolio but also the CAC 40 index. To the contrary, the Addition portfolio 
underperformed the index over the period of time and therefore dragged down its overall 
performance. Nevertheless, the t-test score again indicates that the results cannot be 
generalised. Since the Addition portfolio exhibits negative returns unlike the Deletion 
portfolio, measures of risk reward ratios such as the Sharpe and Treynor ratios seem to be 
irrelevant. 
 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics of the daily market adjusted returns for the Deletion and 
Addition portfolios over the period 1993 – 2009. 
 Deletion Portfolio Addition Portfolio 
Average adjusted daily 
return (%) 
0.012 (0.0002) 
Difference in mean (2-
tailed) 0.544 
Minimum (%) -5.3 -9.3 
Maximum (%) 8.3 4.1 
Std. Deviation 0.012 0.006 
Skewness 0.05 (0.649) 
Kurtosis 2.094 12 
CAR as of December 31st, 
2009 
0.215 (0.091) 
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4.3. Substituted stocks’ behavior after substitution 
 
Another way to study whether stocks added to the CAC 40 index outperform those they 
replace is to look at their average returns at different intervals after replacement was 
announced. Thus, I look at the daily returns for each deleted or added stock starting ten 
trading days after the announcement was made in order to adjust for known temporary 
abnormal market activities surrounding the stocks’ replacements in the CAC 40. The 
added and deleted stocks' daily and cumulative returns are then averaged and compared. 
 
Table 4 shows the average daily performance of all substituted stocks' at 250-trading-day 
intervals (a calendar year) over the first five years after replacement was announced. 
Over the first 250 trading days, deleted stocks clearly outperform added stocks. Indeed, 
deleted stocks yield 0.018% per day while added stocks lose (0.01)% per day over the 
same period. Furthermore, deleted stocks show to be slightly less volatile as measured by 
the standard deviation of their average returns. Over the four following years however, 
added stocks outperform deleted stocks three times. Considering 250-day intervals, the 
results indicate that added stocks' relative underperformance compared to deleted stocks 
does not last beyond the first trading year after replacement. However, volatility as 
measured by standard deviation tend to be greater for added stocks than for deleted 
stocks. 
 
Table 4. Stocks’ average daily returns for different horizons after substitution date. 
Year Day Deletions (%) Std. 
Deviation 
Additions 
(%) 
Std. 
Deviation 
1 250 0.018 0.018 (0.01) 0.022 
2 500 0.041 0.03 0.053 0.035 
3 750 0.022 0.02 0.062 0.059 
4 1,000 0.091 0.093 (0.014) 0.02 
5 1,250 0.008 0.033 0.04 0.054 
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Figure 9 illustrates the cumulative returns for deleted and added stocks after substitution 
announcement. It shows that deleted stocks clearly outperform added stocks five years 
after replacement was announced. The graph also shows that around year three, added 
stocks have a higher terminal value than deleted stocks. Finally, the graph shows that 
deleted stocks perform extremely well compared to added stocks during the fourth year 
after substitution was announced. 
 
 
Figure 9. Substituted stocks' cumulative returns over 5 trading years. 
  
Table 5 shows added and deleted stocks' cumulative returns at 250-day intervals (a 
calendar year) over the first five years after replacement was announced. The average 
level of wealth is higher for the deletion portfolio in all but one of the five considered 
years. The added stocks in fact lose value during the first year after replacement was 
announced contrary to deleted stocks. After five years, deleted stocks' value increased by 
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an average of 53.5% while added stocks increased by an average of 35.9%. Year three is 
the only year when added stocks' terminal value is higher than that of the deleted stocks. 
 
Table 5. Stocks’ cumulative returns for different horizons after substitution date. 
Year Day Deletions Additions 
1 250 1.041 0.9731 
2 500 1.149 1.107 
3 750 1.209 1.288 
4 1,000 1.511 1.237 
5 1,250 1.535 1.359 
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Increasingly popular passive investment strategies simply replicate the performance of 
their benchmark stock index. However, stock indexes' composition is reviewed and 
revised at regular intervals (quarterly for the CAC 40 index). In the specific case of 
exclusive indexes, the composition is left to the discretion of steering committees. It is 
therefore important for passive investors to gain an understanding of the impact of the 
committees' decisions on the performance of their portfolio as well as for other investors 
to anticipate how substituted stocks are likely to perform after they are added to or 
removed from an exclusive index. Interestingly, while the days and weeks surrounding 
stocks' addition to or removal from an index have been thoroughly documented, long 
term analyses of their performance following substitution are scarce. This thesis is one of 
the few attempts to look into the matter. 
 
This paper investigates whether stocks deleted from the French CAC 40 index 
outperformed stocks added to the index between 1993 and 2009. As a first attempt to 
understand stocks' behaviour after addition to or removal from the index, I compare the 
performance of a portfolio composed of stocks deleted from the index with the 
performance of a portfolio composed of stocks added to the index. I find that the portfolio 
composed of stocks deleted from the index outperforms the portfolio composed of stocks 
added to the index by 0.013% on average each day. Furthermore, the results indicate that 
the deletion portfolio’s performance is not due to higher risk. In addition, the excess 
returns do not require short sales and do not incur large transaction costs. However, the 
results cannot be generalised perhaps due to too short a time-series. 
 
In a second phase, I analyse the average return at different intervals of all added and 
deleted stocks. I find that deleted stocks clearly outperformed added stocks over the first 
250 trading days after substitution is announced. Indeed, deleted stocks yielded 0.018% 
per day while added stocks lost (0.01)% per day over the same period. Looking at 
cumulative returns, deleted stocks showed an average increase in value of 4.1% 
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compared to an average loss of 2.69% for added stocks one year after substitution was 
announced. Over five years, deleted stocks yielded 53.5% while added stocks yielded 
only 35.9%. 
 
I mainly attribute these findings to two mutually supportive factors. First, index rules 
favour the addition of stocks which have performed well in the recent past and the 
removal of stocks which have performed poorly in the recent past. Second, as the 
phenomenon of mean regression in stock prices slowly takes its toll, stocks that have 
been performing exceptionally well in the recent past (such as those added to exclusive 
blue-chip stock indexes) are bound to lower performance in the future as their 
performance regresses to their long term trend. To the contrary, stocks which have been 
performing exceptionally poorly in the recent past (such as those removed from exclusive 
blue-chip stock indexes) are bound to higher performance in the future as their 
performance regress to their long term trend. Interestingly, just like the debate about 
mean regression in stock prices is still not closed, my results cannot be generalised. 
However, I believe this paper is valuable to contrarian investors who could take 
advantage of my findings to buy equities after they have been deleted from an exclusive 
index and by short selling stocks after they have been added to an exclusive index. The 
findings could also improve stock indexes’ rules by pointing at certain biased rules. 
 
Considering the small amount of research on the topic and given that following a similar 
methodology has led to different results, additional analyses on the long term behavior of 
substituted stocks should be conducted. Unlike mine, Arora et al.’s results (2008) were 
statistically significant; therefore research could be done based on other exclusive 
indexes. In the same vein, researchers could look at different index types such as small or 
mid cap indexes for instance. Yet again, researchers could use the CAC 40 index on 
which this thesis was based and extend the study period perhaps going as far back as 
1987 when the index was launched. Indeed, too short a time series may explain why my 
results are not statistically significant. The most directly comparable papers analyse much 
longer periods and hence have many more observations and clean changes to account for. 
Arora et al. (2008) study the Dow Jones Industrial Index since its launch in 1928, Siegel 
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and Schwartz (2006) use the S&P 500 since 1957 and Cai and Houge (2008) look at the 
Russel 2000 since 1979. In a similar fashion to Siegel and Schwartz (2006), researchers 
could replicate an original index as it was when first launched and track its performance 
had there been no rebalancing. Finally, on a different but related topic, further research 
should be conducted looking into the characteristics and the recent past performance of 
the stocks newly added to or removed from exclusive indexes. The results may highlight 
some bias in stock index rules and hence help steering committees correct them. 
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APPENDIX 1. List of "clean" changes on the CAC 40 between 1993 and 
2009 
 
 
Date of Announcement Additions Deletions 
1993   
October 19
th
  BNP Cap Gémini 
 Crédit Local de France Chargeurs* 
 Promodès Club Méditerranée 
   
1995   
January 11
th
 Eurotunnel Casino Guichard-Perrachon 
 Pinault-Printemps-Redoute CGIP 
 Renault Euro-Disney 
   
October 11
th
 Eridania Beghin Say Crédit Foncier de France 
   
1997   
January 27
th
 Valeo Saint-Louis 
   
September 22
nd
 France Telecom Bouygues 
 ST MicroElectronics Pernod-Ricard 
   
1998   
April 24
th
  Sodexho-Alliance Havas Advertising 
   
1999   
February 1
st
 Casino-Guichard Usinor 
   
June 18
th
  Equant Bic 
   
October 1
st
  Bouygues Eridania Beghin Say 
   
2000   
May 10
th
  TF1 Legrand 
   
2001   
July 11
th
  Vivendi Environement Valéo 
   
2002   
March 1
st
 Vinci Alstom 
   
July 9
th
  Crédit Agricole Dassault Systèmes 
   
2004   
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December 20
th
  Essilor International Sodexho Alliance 
2005   
August 4
th
  Gaz de France Casino Guichard 
   
November 24
th
  EDF TF1 
   
2006   
June 23
rd
 Alstom Thales 
   
November 24
th
  Vallourec Publicis 
   
2007   
May 29
th
  Air France-KLM Thomson 
   
2009   
September 4
th
 Technip Air France-KLM 
 
Number of Replacements 25 25 
 
 
*: No data available 
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APPENDIX 2. Difference in daily returns 
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APPENDIX 3. Histogram of the portfolios' daily returns 
 
 
 
Histogram of the deletion portfolio's daily returns. 
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Histogram of the addition portfolio’s daily returns. 
 
